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Abstract 
Why did the Lofoten cod fishery in Norway – a fishery on one of the world’s richest spawning grounds - 
remain less productive than alternative industries until the mid-1960s, despite important modernization of 
the fleet and fishing gear, improvements in technology and institutional change? We analyze the effect of 
technological change on labor and total factor productivity as well as exit and entry patterns using detailed 
data for 130 years. Our findings support the important role of natural resources in productivity and 
improvements in welfare in natural resource-based industries. The total factor productivity has risen faster 
than labor productivity in the fishery, indicating that the considerable technological progress in this 
industry has to some extent been neutralized by the decline in the fish stock. Open access to the fish 
resource most probably led to this situation. 
                                                 
* We thank Ola Grytten, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, for access to 
data on wages for the manufacturing and agricultural industry in Norway.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The received wisdom from economics is that new knowledge and technological change is 
the only source of growth and improved welfare. How does this play out in industries 
based on common natural resources? The ongoing discussion about improvements in 
fishing technology threatening fish stocks indicates that the fruits of technological 
progress might not materialize in such industries. 
Our point of departure is the puzzle raised by the low productivity of a resource 
based industry over 130 years; the Lofoten cod fishery. This fishery, taking place on one 
of the world’s most productive spawning grounds, had several major occurrences of 
technological change over the last 130 years, and yet labor productivity remained low for 
a long time, lagging behind productivity development in agriculture and manufacturing 
over most of the period.1 How could this be? 
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Figure 1: Indices of wages in agriculture and manufacturing, and 9-years moving average of revenues per 
fisherman. 
 
Figure 1 shows the development of wages in agriculture and manufacturing, as 
well as the value of the catch per fisherman (9-years moving average). Except for two 
brief periods (around 1870 and in the 1940s), revenues per fisherman lagged behind 
wages in agriculture and manufacturing until the mid-1960s, when they took a big leap 
                                                 
1 We do not have absolute values for productivity in agriculture and industry, only indices. Hence, what we 
can state unambiguously is that productivity grew more slowly in the Lofoten fishery than in the two other 
industries we compare with.  
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forward. Comparing the 1970s and 80s with the 1860s, fishermen did better than keep 
pace with agriculture and manufacturing, even allowing for some decline in their share of 
revenues. This was, however, no less due to a rise in price than a rise in catch volume per 
fisherman (cf. Figure 5 below). 
Our main strategy for analyzing the effect of technological and institutional 
change on the development of productivity in the Lofoten fishery is to focus on the 
interaction between technological and institutional change in this fishery over 130 years 
and the natural resource on which it was based. The theory of open access natural 
resources tells us that they will be overexploited and that labor productivity of the 
associated industries will be on par with comparable occupations. It also tells us that 
people will flock into such industries as occupations of last resort if opportunities in the 
labor market dry up, a process that in the end is likely to be self-defeating and to make a 
negligible and possibly negative contribution to the total wealth of the economy. We will 
analyze this issue in the Lofoten fishery by estimating exit and entry rates combined with 
productivity measures of the fishery.  
Even if an open access resource industry appears stagnant in terms of 
productivity, technology could still be progressing at a rate comparable to other 
industries, with its fruits rotting away as it were through excessive exploitation. To 
examine this we will calculate total factor productivity, with the fish stock as a factor of 
production in addition to labor and boats. This concept is analogous to total factor 
productivity in other industries with one exception; high total factor productivity in the 
fishery does not necessarily make anyone better off. Total factor productivity might grow 
in the fishery, and yet the total production of fish might decline for any given input of 
factors under human control, due to a declining fish stock. In an ordinary manufacturing 
industry, rising total factor productivity is good news because production can be 
maintained despite less use of labor and capital, making it possible to share the value 
produced among fewer people working and provide a higher return to the owners of 
capital. In addition the labor released and the capital no longer needed could be used for 
other purposes, making the whole economy better off. But a decline of fish stocks has no 
such effects. A declining fish stock does not mean that more fish become available for 
some purpose other than fishing; a declining fish stock is likely to put an upward pressure 
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on the cost per unit of fish caught and will ultimately reduce the surplus growth of the 
stock, which sets the limits for sustainable fishing. Growth in total factor productivity in 
the fishery while fish stocks decline would indicate that the fishing technology is 
progressing well, but it would not necessarily result in larger or cheaper fish catches. 
Hence, taking the role of fish stocks for productivity into account could explain what the 
technological development in the industry really is, whether or not it is comparable to 
other industries, and why it might be that technological progress in the fishery would not 
translate into larger fish catches and higher wages for fishermen.  
The Lofoten fishery has a long history. It is mentioned in Egil’s Saga, which deals 
with events that took place in the 800s AD. Later, dried fish (stockfish) from Lofoten was 
a major item of trade for the Hanseatic League and the reason for their trading post in 
Bergen, which lasted for hundreds of years. It was an important source of income—or a 
gamble to bet on—even for people from distant parts of Norway and still attracts 
fishermen from afar. For hundreds of years it was by far the most important fishery in 
Norway and indeed one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing as late 
as in 1920 about 20,000 men stating fishing as their main occupation, compared to 
90,000 farmers (Norwegian census, 1920). The fishery exploits the annual spawning 
migration of the Northeast Arctic cod, which in winter comes from the Barents Sea and 
the Norwegian Sea towards the Norwegian coast to spawn, mainly around the Lofoten 
islands. The fishery is seasonal, beginning in late January and ending in late April. 
In the period analyzed in this paper, several important technological changes took 
place. Up to about 1880 the fishing fleet consisted mainly of small open boats using hand 
line, long line and gill nets. Most boats were less than 20 feet long and employed on 
average six men. From 1880 until about 1905 decked boats took over and sails were 
introduced¸ the boats became larger, but they still employed about the same number of 
men. From 1905 until 1920 the fleet was motorized and the boats became larger still. So, 
by 1920, the Lofoten fishery had a relatively modern fishing fleet where about 40 percent 
were decked boats, the majority of these with an engine. About half of these boats were 
less than 40 feet long, while the open boats were mostly under 30 feet (Brandal, 1982). A 
major institutional change took place in the 1930s when the first hand sale of cod was 
organized into a monopoly owned by the fishermen. From the early to mid-1950s 
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onwards there was a major change in the quality of the gear when monofiber nets were 
introduced.2 In the 1950s purse seine was used on a large scale and then outlawed. In 
1959 Danish seine was introduced. From the 1970s increasingly sophisticated jigging 
machines for hand lines came into use.  
This paper exploits data series which for some variables extend back to 1860. 
From that time on we have information on aggregate catches and the number of 
fishermen and boats participating in the fishery. This makes it possible to track the 
development in labor productivity (or boat productivity) over almost 130 years. Labor 
productivity is of direct relevance for the wages the industry is able to pay. In the Lofoten 
fishery, as in many other fisheries, labor is not paid a going wage but a share of the catch 
value, and unless the share parameter is changed there is a direct relationship between 
labor productivity and what the fishermen are paid. But even with a market-determined, 
parametric wage, the fishery’s ability to compete with other industries for labor would for 
obvious reasons be closely related to the productivity of labor.  
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next two sections we provide a description of 
the data and the industry, including descriptive statistics of labor productivity, entry into 
the industry, the stages of technological change seen in the industry, as well as 
development of prices and resource abundance. In Section 4 we conduct an extensive 
analysis of total factor productivity and technological change, taking the fish resource 
into account within a formal framework. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Data  
Since 1859, the year the Lofoten Law of 1857 took effect, a report on the Lofoten fishery 
has been published annually. These reports contain much information on the fishery and 
events related to it.3 Up to the 1930s the information became increasingly detailed. There 
are records of how many fishermen and boats participated in the fishery, from 1875 
broken down on the gear types used, how much fish they caught, on byproducts such as 
fish liver, on prices of fish and byproducts, the weather, the number of ships coming to 
                                                 
2 See Brandal (1981, 1982), Johansen (1999), Mathiesen (1981), Martinussen (2006), and Gerhardsen 
(1946), for more details of the development of the fishery.  
3 Since 1906 these reports have been published by the Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet), but 
prior to that by its forerunner (Norges Fiskeristyrelse) and the Department of the Interior (Departementet 
for det Indre).  All the reports are available electronically from the Institute of Marine Research, Bergen. 
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Lofoten to buy fish, and much else.4 After the 1930s the degree of detail in the reports 
declined gradually, and as of the early years of this century they are just a six page 
summary with a few graphs and tables, whereas in the 1930s they would run to over a 
hundred pages. This poses certain problems in getting long, consistent time series of 
variables. 
The data on catches and participation in the fishery have been collected from 
these annual reports. The participation is based on a census of fishermen and boats at a 
certain date about half way through the fishing season when the fishery is close to its 
peak.5 Participation varies throughout the season, increasing gradually up to a peak and 
then falling off towards the end. It is highly likely that people left the fishery early if the 
fishery was not going well, and their decision to begin fishing, or whether to participate 
at all, is likely to have been influenced by news about how well the fishery was going. 
After the telegraph and, later, telephone came on the scene the fishermen had access to 
up-to-date news about this. The participation measures thus are imperfect in that they say 
nothing about the intensity of participation; clearly the fishing effort by a thousand boats 
over four weeks is not the same as that of eight hundred over six weeks; in fact the latter 
would be greater, all else equal. 
The Lofoten reports contain no data on how much capital was invested in the 
boats, and neither do they specify the size or other physical characteristics of the boats 
that might be used as proxies for the capital investment. From other sources we know, 
however, that even if most boats were small there were considerable differences in size 
and equipment. Beginning in 1936, cost and earnings studies of the Lofoten fishery were 
carried out until the 1960s, when such studies were extended to the entire Norwegian 
fishing fleet. These studies reported the size distribution of the boats participating in the 
fishery. Over this 30-year period this did not change a great deal; the range was wide, 
                                                 
4 From 1879 there are detailed tables on the diseases treated by the resident doctors during the fishing 
season, from which we can find, among other things, how many persons were treated for syphilis (the 
maximum was 14 in 1895, and the last case was recorded in 1952) and how many teeth were pulled (a 
maximum of 1346 in 1935). We can also find how many tradesmen and other professionals of various 
kinds traveled to Lofoten during the fishing season to offer their services. One such was quacksalvers, of 
whom there was a maximum of four in 1898, but none in some years, and they dropped out entirely after 
1935. 
5 Before 1918 this was March 16, but March 22 from that year on. 
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from less than 20 to over 80 feet length, but most boats were between 20 and 50 feet.6 
Later on we will refer to some of the results from these investigations. 
The data on the fish stock stretch back to 1900 and were obtained from the 
Institute of Marine Research in Bergen. These data are based on stock assessment 
models, which follow the age composition of the stock through time. Even if these 
methods are known to have their limits in providing up-to-date assessments of the stock, 
their accuracy for any given year improves as time goes by and more becomes known 
about the life history of the different year classes of fish. The data on the stock provide 
figures for the mature part (which is exploited by the Lofoten fishery) separately and are 
expressed in weight units. The fish mature at an age of six to seven years, and the 
spawning stock consists of several year classes, the oldest fish being over 10 years. The 
stock data for 1900-1912 were estimated using the catch per fisherman.7 While these data 
undoubtedly are less than perfect, they certainly are the best ones available. There is 
reason to expect the more recent data to be more accurate than earlier ones, due to 
improvements in stock assessment methodology. 
 
3. The Lofoten Fishery: Background and description 
3.1 Major developments 
Traditionally the Lofoten fishery was pursued with hand lines, each fisherman holding a 
line with a sinker and a baited hook. In the 1700s new types of fishing gear came into 
use; gill nets and long lines left lying in the water overnight. Originally there was much 
opposition to the novel gears from those who used the traditional hand line. A petition 
was sent to the King in Copenhagen (Norway was at that time under the King of 
Denmark), begging for these new gear types to be banned. The King was apparently 
sympathetic to the fishermen’s arguments, and in 1744 he sent a letter to the governor of 
Nordland County, admonishing him to allow only the use of hand lines, which “since 
time immemorial have been used in the fishery by rich and poor alike”8 Over time the 
                                                 
6 These reports were published in the series Årsberetning vedkommende Norges Fiskerier, and later in the 
journal ”Fiskets Gang,” published by the Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet), Bergen. 
7 For details on the data, see Hylen (2002). 
8The King’s letter refers to some of the arguments advanced against the new gear types. They were said to 
be too expensive for the common man to acquire and to cause much distress to Our Lord through 
encouraging the use of foul language and fights. The letter is quoted in Steen (1930), p. 30. 
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once so novel gear types became traditional and are now referred to as such, but 
opposition to new types of fishing gear or new technology has been a recurrent theme in 
the Lofoten fishery, and so have petitions to ban their use. Sometimes they have met with 
success, such as for seines in the latter part of the 19th century and purse seine in the 
1950s, while at other times the new technology has carried the day, such as engines in the 
early 1900s and Danish seine after 1959. 
In 1816, after the restoration of the Norwegian state, albeit in a union with 
Sweden, a law on the Lofoten fishery was enacted. This law went a long way towards 
establishing what lately has come to be known as territorial use rights (Christy, 1983). 
The fishing banks were divided into areas belonging to the nearest fishing base on land 
and further subdivided into fields where the boats were allowed to fish. The allocation of 
the fishing fields was in the hands of local governing committees, usually headed by the 
owner of the onshore facilities which the fishermen had to rent for accommodation and 
for drying the fish. In practice these fishing fields became an informal property of the 
owner of the onshore facilities, being rented out with the base on land, with good fields 
carrying a premium rent (Solhaug, 1983). 
Over time, dissatisfaction with these arrangements developed. One important 
contributing factor seems to have been a shift in fish migrations from the eastern part of 
Lofoten to the western part (Solhaug, 1983), but such shifts occur from time to time, 
presumably depending on environmental factors. Being tied to one particular fishing 
place impeded pursuing the fish wherever they happened to be, and in the western area 
there was more space and less need for a spatial regulation. This resulted in a new law on 
the Lofoten fishery, enacted in 1857. This law did away with the previous spatial 
regulation and made it clear that anyone had the right to fish wherever he wanted, but 
allowed for division of the fishing grounds between different gear types if deemed 
necessary to avoid entanglements. The new law thus established the Lofoten fishery as an 
open access fishery, but subject to certain rules of conduct. The law established a 
regulatory authority for the Lofoten fishery, which purpose was ensuring that the rules of 
conduct were followed, such as not leaving harbor until the morning signal had been 
given, not setting any fishing gear after a certain hour in the evening, and respecting the 
division of the fishing areas between the various gear types. 
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The law of 1857 certainly resounded with the prevailing free enterprise spirit of 
the time. The Lofoten reports also made it quite clear that the purpose of the law was to 
increase the efficiency of the fishery by making it easier to follow the fish to wherever 
they happened to be and to allow the fishermen to use their skills and endurance to the 
utmost. This was long before overexploitation of fish resources had been recognized; on 
the contrary it was widely believed, even by prominent biologists, that fish resources 
were inexhaustible and that fishing made no difference whatever for their fecundity 
(Smith, 1994). 
Over time, discontent also developed over the new law. As the number of 
fishermen increased, spatial control again became necessary to avoid gear collisions. The 
law allowed for dividing the fishing banks between different types of gear, but not 
between boats, and that arrangement apparently was not what the fishermen sought. 
Instead they sought influence over the division of ocean space between different gears 
and other regulatory issues, not least because of the development of new gears such as 
seines, which most of them wanted banned, and because of attempts by some landowners 
to close off certain areas where the fish concentrated and either have it all for themselves 
or charge fishermen for access to these areas. Yet another law was enacted in 1897, 
giving fishermen influence over management through consultative committees while 
keeping the ultimate authority and enforcement firmly in the hands of the state. This 
arrangement has basically prevailed until this day. 
The Lofoten fishery remained an open access fishery until 1990. There were no 
restrictions on the number of boats, fishing time, or quantity of fish caught.9 In 1989 a 
limit was set for the first time on how much fish could be caught, and the fishery was 
stopped half way through the season when this limit had been reached. In the following 
years individual boat quotas or quotas for groups of boats were used, which limited the 
amount of fishing time at least some boats could spend in this fishery. Because of this our 
analysis of the fishery will end in 1988, the last year without regulations affecting fishing 
time and the quantity caught. 
                                                 
9 There were a few exceptions to this. In 1981-84 the fishery was stopped in-season for about two weeks, 
which included the Easter holiday, during which little fishing would have taken place anyway. In the 1950s 
and 60s it occasionally happened that the fishery was halted for a few days or limits set on the catches of 
individual boats because of market problems. 
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3.2 The Lofoten fishery 1860-1988: technical change and institutional change 
In this section we will describe the development of participation, technological and 
institutional change taking place in different periods, as well as the development of catch 
and stock in the Lofoten fishery. The main aim is to identify different periods in the 
fishery in terms of technology and participation. . 
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Figure 2: Fixed base indices for fish catch, the number of fishermen, fishing boats, and spawning stock in 
the Lofoten fishery 1860-1988. 1900 = 100. 
 
 Figure 2 shows the development of men, boats, catch, fish price and fish stock 
from 1860 until 1988. Participation in the Lofoten fishery, whether measured as number 
of fishermen or boats, evolved in a somewhat cyclical fashion; it was high in the 1880s 
and 1890s and peaked again in the 1930s. It declined sharply from the early 1950s to 
1965 and continued declining after that, but at a lower rate and somewhat irregularly. 
 The development of participation is most likely connected to different periods in 
the fishery in terms of technological change in boat and gear types and institutional 
change. Based on Figure 2 and the somewhat scarce literature, we think five different 
periods can be distinguished (Brandal, 1981, 1982; Solhaug, 1983; Lefdalsnes, 1969; 
Iversen, 1937): 
1. Until about 1880: mostly small and open boats without sail, using gill nets, long 
line and hand line. 
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2. From about 1880 to 1906: Open boats were replaced by decked boats with sail, 
even if many open boats remained. Decked boats were larger than the open boats. 
Sail boats used small boats (“dories”) for net and long line. 
3. From 1906 to 1920: Motorization of the fleet. By 1920 most of the decked boats 
had engines. Most of the change took place from about 1912 to 1920. 
4. From 1920 to about 1940: Two distinct changes occurred; (i) mass increase in the 
participation of open boats using hand line and long line; (ii) enactment in 1938 of 
a law giving fishermen monopoly of sales of fish at the first hand (the so-called 
Raw Fish Law). 
5. From the mid- to late 1950s: the introduction of nets made of synthetic fiber, and, 
later, development of increasingly sophisticated jigging machines for hand lines. 
Probably also general improvement in technology proceeding in small, 
incremental steps. 
 
3.3 Participation in the fishery 
We are interested in finding out whether the Lofoten fishery follows a pattern expected 
from an open access-common resource industry, which is that the net entry rate into the 
fishery follows the expected profitability or productivity in the industry.   
The long term changes in participation (Figure 2) are probably related to both 
demographic development and “outside options.” Before 1900 there was substantial 
immigration to Nordland County, whereas there was substantial emigration, both to the 
rest of the country and to America during the two decades after 1900. In the two decades 
1920-1940 the emigration to America slowed to a trickle, because of restrictions in the 
United States, and emigration to the rest of Norway also declined because of a slowdown 
in industrial development and economic growth in general.10 After 1950 the Norwegian 
economy entered a phase of full employment and rapid economic growth, coinciding 
with a rapid decline in the participation in the Lofoten fishery. 
The variations in participation are rather moderate compared with the fish catches, 
which display both short term and long term variability. Much of this variability is 
evidently related to variations in the fish stock. Very roughly we can identify two periods 
                                                 
10 On the demographic development up to 1940 and the importance of “outside options,” see Vea (1988). 
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of large but variable catches, 1860 to 1900 and mid-1920s to 1950. From 1900 to the 
mid-1920s and after 1950 catches were much lower and less variable, except for a peak in 
the early 1970s. 
The Lofoten fishery is a seasonal fishery, and even fishermen from distant parts of 
Norway sailed to Lofoten to participate in it. Their decision to participate undoubtedly 
depended on a number of things, such as the prospects in other fisheries or activities, but 
the prospects for the Lofoten fishery itself must have been an important consideration. In 
the early years before modern fish stock assessment was developed, allowing fisheries 
biologists to predict the size of the fish stock for the coming season, the boat owners are 
likely to have based their expectations of the coming Lofoten season on the results of the 
previous season. Even if they later based their decisions on up-to-date fish stock 
assessments their expectations might appear as being backward looking, because the 
prospects in the Lofoten fishery are largely determined by exceptionally strong year 
classes of fish, which persist over several years. Many of the Lofoten reports mention 
poor results of previous years as a reason for a decline in the number of fishermen and 
boats, and vice versa. As the communications technology developed (from telegraph to 
telephone and radio) the reports refer to prospective fishermen as following the 
development of the fishery from the start of the season, but the impression they give is 
that this primarily affected the decision when to depart for Lofoten rather than whether or 
not to participate in the fishery. 
 To examine this, we investigate whether the annual change in the number of boats 
is related to the productivity in the fishery. Two measures of productivity are available 
from the data at hand: (i) the catch per fisherman, and (ii) the catch value per fisherman, 
where for the latter we simply multiply by the fish price adjusted for changes in the value 
of money measured by the consumer price index.11 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Catch per boat could also be used, and one could argue that it would be more relevant, since the decision 
about participation is taken by boat owners, but the development in the number of fishermen and boats is in 
any case quite similar. By looking at catch per fisherman rather than per boat we avoid having the variable 
to be explained on both sides of the regression equation. 
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Table 1: Regression of the change in the number of boats on the change in catch per fisherman (Equation 
[1]). First differences of logarithms. t-values in parentheses. ** (*) significance at the 1% (5%) level.  
 
 a0 a1 a2 R2 
All boats 
1860-1988 
-0.0156 
(-1.26) 
0.00316 
(0.08) 
0.1787** 
(4.35) 
0.14 
Gill nets 
1875-1988 
-0.0138 
(-0.83) 
0.0371 
(0.87) 
0.2455** 
(5.74) 
0.23 
Long line 
1875-1988 
-0.0274 
(-1.83) 
-0.0649 
(-1.52) 
0.1624** 
(3.81) 
0.15 
Hand line 
1875-1988 
-0.0113 
(-0.40) 
-0.0921* 
(-2.29) 
0.1456** 
(3.65) 
0.18 
Purse seine 
1950-1958 
-0.2378 
(-1.01) 
0.4442 
(1.70) 
-0.5113 
(-1.43) 
0.60 
Danish seine 
1959-1988 
0.0207 
(0.08) 
0.0368 
(0.32) 
-0.0025 
(-0.02) 
0.00 
 
Table 1 shows the results of regressing the change in the number of boats in the 
fishery on the change in the catch per fisherman, contemporary and lagged.12 The 
regression equation is 
(1)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 21 1ln ln ln / ln / ln / ln /t t tt t t t 2B B a a Y L Y L a Y L Y L u− − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡− = + − + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ − ⎤⎦
                                                
 
where B is the number of boats, Y is the catch of fish, L is the number of fishermen, t 
denotes year, and u is an error term. The only significant coefficient in the regression 
including all boats is change in catch per fisherman lagged one year, indicating that 
participation in the fishery was indeed influenced by the catch per fisherman in the 
previous year’s season (further lags were insignificant). This pattern is quite but not 
completely persistent as we lop years off the regression at either end. Ending the series 
about 1900 makes the lagged value of catch per fisherman insignificant (5% level of 
significance), but a significant t-value persists even if we begin the series in 1971. This 
indicates that the influence of the previous season on participation in the fishery was if 
anything less strong in the 1800s, even if participation and its variability were much 
greater then than in the latter half of the 20th century. Looking at the individual gear 
types, the results are similar for gill nets, long lines and hand lines, while for purse seine 
 
12 First differences of logarithms were used, as unit root is not consistently rejected for level variables and 
the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates serial correlation for some regressions in levels of variables. As the 
R2’s in Table 1 show, rather little of the variation in participation is explained by the variation in catches 
per fisherman. Regression in levels of variables shows that most of the participation in the fishery is 
explained by the number of boats lagged one year; the R2’s are around or above 0.9 and the regression 
coefficient for ln(Y/L)t-1 is significant for all boats and for nets, long lines and hand lines. 
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and Danish seine we do not get significant coefficients. The participation of long line and 
hand line boats is the most variable one (see Figure 4 below). 
One might think that the catch value per fisherman would be a more appropriate 
explanatory variable for participation in the fishery than the catch quantity per fisherman. 
Running the same kind of regression with productivity defined in revenue terms gives 
poorer results; the t-value of the lagged productivity variable is lower (but still 
significant), except for gill net boats where it is slightly higher, and it becomes 
insignificant much more quickly as we lop off years at either end of the series for all 
boats. 
One reason why catch volume rather than value is a determinant of participation 
could be that the price of fish is inversely related to the catch volume. The boat owners 
might not have been able to take this appropriately into account. Furthermore, this 
relationship has changed over time. Figure 3 shows the development of the (real) price of 
fish 1860-1988. Up to about 1900 the price was variable, but low and without trend. 
About 1900 it began to trend upwards and increased steeply during the First World War. 
Then it fell and stayed low during the Great Depression, but began to rise when the 
Second World War began and increased further, with some hiccups, until 1988. In that 
year the real price was about eight times what it had been in 1860. 
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Figure 3: Catch and the real price of fish in the Lofoten fishery 1860-1988. 
 
 14
Table 2: Regression of change in real price on change in total catch (Equation [2]). First differences of 
logarithms. t-values in parentheses. ** Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Period a0 a1 R2 
1860-1988 0.0107 
(0.48) 
-0.3193 
(-4.83**) 
0.16 
1860-1937 0.0031 
(0.09) 
-0.4408** 
(-4.11) 
0.18 
1938-88 0.0277 
(1.34) 
-0.1759** 
(-3,10) 
0.16 
 
Since price apparently has little effect on participation in the fishery and the 
abundance of fish is given by nature, it makes sense to regard price as depending on 
quantity, as follows: 
(2) . ( )1 0 1 1ln ln ln lnt t t tP P a a Q Q− −− = + − + tu
 Table 2 shows the results of estimating Equation (2). The coefficient a1, which is 
the inverse of price elasticity and often called price flexibility, is negative and significant. 
In 1938 the fish market became regulated by a law giving a marketing board (the Raw 
Fish Marketing Board) acting on behalf of the fishermen the right to administer the first-
hand sale of fish and to set prices, an arrangement that still persist. The purpose was to 
raise the price and lower its variability. The results from Table 2 are consistent with the 
latter being successful; the price flexibility parameter is significantly lower for the period 
1938-88 than the earlier period, indicating less responsiveness of the price to changes in 
the volume of landings. 
 
3.4 Changing gear type 
Some of the change in the number of boats using a particular type of gear could be due to 
boats shifting fishing gear from one year to another rather than changes in the total 
number of boats. Different gear types select somewhat different age groups of fish. The 
strength of these age groups can vary substantially, so that the relative advantage of 
different gear types may change from one year to the next. Several of the Lofoten reports 
refer to boats changing gear types from one year to another, as well as some boats using 
different gear types in the same season, making the classification on the basis of fishing 
gear somewhat arbitrary. In any case the results in Table 1 indicate that catch results in 
 15
the previous season influenced the total participation in the fishery as well as the 
participation of boats using a particular gear, whether the latter was due to gear-switching 
or not. 
Figure 4 shows the number of boats using the three traditional gear types; gill 
nets, long lines, and hand lines. The most conspicuous feature is the enormous bulge in 
the number of hand line boats from 1920 to 1965, rising from a few hundred in 1920 to 
over 5000 in the early 1930s and then dropping off gradually, with some fluctuations. 
The surge in the number of hand line boats was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of fishermen per boat, so for a time that number was about the same as for the 
long line boats (see Figure 6), while both before and after it was much lower. The 
increase in the number of hand line boats in the 1920s was not due to a switch of gears; 
the number of long line boats was also increasing while the number of gill net boats 
changed little. It thus appears that many owners of relatively large boats decided to 
participate in the Lofoten fishery in the 1920s and then gradually pulled out (or switched 
gear) from about 1930 onwards. The number of long line and gill net boats has also been 
variable, but less so, especially the gill net boats. There is some evidence of gear-
switching between gill net and long-line boats up to about 1920 in that we find 
significantly negative correlations for some sub-periods. 
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Figure 4: Number of boats using nets, hand lines and long lines. 
 
It is very tempting to see this increase in the number of hand line boats in the 
1920s as a result of poor outside opportunities together with a continuing population 
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growth (Lefsdalsnes, 1969). The 1920s were a period of economic stagnation in Norway, 
and the emigration to the United States had declined substantially. Hand lines were the 
cheapest fishing gear available and so the poor man’s choice. What is a bit surprising is 
that this development was to some extent reversed in the 1930s, also difficult times with 
few opportunities. Some of that may be due to frustrated expectations; the Lofoten 
reports in the 1930s make references to fishermen leaving Lofoten poorer than when they 
came and in need of financial help to go back home. 
 
3.5 Labor productivity 
Figure 5 shows the development of productivity, measured as catch volume and value per 
fisherman. There was surprisingly little trend in productivity until the mid-1960s, when it 
was in fact little higher in volume terms than a hundred years before. Because of the 
enormous inter-annual variability, moving averages provide a better basis of comparison 
than comparing just initial and final years. Figure 5 also shows 9-years moving averages, 
which give a reasonable smoothing of the curves. In volume terms, labor productivity 
was almost three times higher in the 1970s and 80s than in the 1860s, but in terms of real 
value it was 15 times greater. Given that the Norwegian economy grew impressively over 
the said period, fishermen would have been in dire straits indeed if rising prices had not 
come to the rescue. 
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Figure 5: Fixed-base indices of productivity (catch per fisherman), in value and volume terms, annual 
values and 9-years moving averages. 
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This rise in the revenue per fisherman coincides with a decline in the number of 
fishermen per boat, as seen from Figure 6. Another noteworthy feature is that rising 
prices compensated for the fall in labor productivity in the 1940s and 50s. In this period 
as well as later prices were regulated by the Raw Fish Marketing Board.  
Even if labor productivity in volume terms remained fairly constant for a hundred 
years, there was some variation in the number of fishermen per boat, as is seen from 
Figure 6. We can identify four phases. From 1860 to about 1900 the number of fishermen 
per boat increased for all three gear types. In the early 1900s the number fell significantly 
over a relatively short period, first for gill net boats, and later for the long line and hand 
line boats. The Lofoten reports mention two reasons for the decline in the number of men 
per boat in gill netting in the latter half of the 1890s. First, beginning in the early 1890s, 
winches were gradually introduced to pull the nets. This, according to the same reports, 
did not result in a smaller crew until a few years later, however. Second, from 1895 a new 
type of net, the so-called small fish net, came into use. This required a smaller crew than 
the other type of net. 
That winches did not immediately result in smaller crews indicates that it takes 
time for a technology to diffuse and for fishing firms to adjust to the new technology. We 
see a similar pattern in the motorization of the boats. Although first introduced around 
1900, this process did not take off until about 1915, but had largely run its course in 
1920, even if many open boats still remained. 
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Figure 6: Fishermen per boat. 
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The first mention of engines in the Lofoten reports occurred in 1895, when a gill 
net boat was reported to have used a petroleum engine, which apparently did not work 
very well. Over the period 1907-1915 much of the fleet was motorized, although boats 
without motor would be in use for many years after that.13 This period coincided with a 
decline in the number of men per boat in the long line and the hand line fishery. 
Replacement of oars and sails by engines is therefore likely to have been labor-saving, 
although the Lofoten reports make no mention of this. Shortly after 1910 the number of 
men per boat began to increase again, first for the gill net boats and later for the long line 
and hand line boats. This could possibly be because boats propelled by engines instead of 
sails and oars could be made bigger, accommodating a larger crew. Then, finally, since 
about 1950 the number of fishermen per boat has fallen almost uniformly. This period 
coincides with strong economic growth and growing real wages in the Norwegian 
economy, which is likely to have encouraged substitution of capital for labor, but only 
after 1965 did labor productivity increase substantially in volume terms (Figure 5).14 
 
4. Productivity and fish abundance 
4.1 Estimating productivity using OLS 
As Figure 2 shows, the size of the spawning stock of the Northeast Arctic cod varies 
substantially from year to year. This figure also indicates that the catches in the Lofoten 
fishery are strongly influenced by the size of the spawning stock. A possible specification 
of a production function taking this into account is the following: 
(3)  a b gtt t tY AE S e=
where Y is the catch of fish, E is fishing effort, and S is the size of the stock, while t is 
time measured in years. The time trend term g is usually thought of as picking up the rate 
of technical progress. 
                                                 
13 That this transition was ongoing but incomplete by 1910 is clear from the Lofoten Report for that year. 
This was apparently not a good year, and many fishermen blamed the noise from motorized boats for 
having scared away the fish. The report concurred with these boats having been numerous and the noise 
formidable, but was otherwise out of sympathy with the complainants, considering the argument as being 
vicarious for arguing against competing and better equipped fishermen. 
14 The Lofoten Reports are surprisingly silent on what technical changes may have been involved. One 
change that apparently increased productivity, although probably not of a labor-saving kind, was the use of 
synthetic materials in nets and lines. This transition took place in the mid-1950s. 
 19
Equation (3) expresses the catch flow at any given time. If the entire stock 
becomes available in the beginning of the fishing season, the stock will be gradually 
depleted as the season progresses, and the catch flow will diminish. For a fishery that 
goes on with a given level of effort over a season of length Δ we would therefore have to 
integrate this function over that time period in order to get a correct expression for the 
total catch over the period. This procedure, and the bias inherent in using (3) under those 
circumstances, are discussed in the Appendix. In the Lofoten fishery the fish enter the 
spawning grounds somewhat gradually and not all at once. This, together with the fact 
that the fishery is relatively short (about three months) and with a peak in the middle, 
which tends to coincide with the main concentration of fish, means that Equation (3) is 
likely to be an acceptable approximation. 
Fishing effort is a notional variable expressing the activity directed at catching the 
fish. This activity is produced by factors of production such as manpower, capital 
invested in boats and other equipment, and other inputs such as fuel. In the data set at 
hand there are only two such factors identified, the number of fishermen and the number 
of boats, but they are so closely correlated (see Figure 2) that both cannot be used 
simultaneously in the same regression, except when using a panel approach and gear type 
dummies. As mentioned in the section about the data used, both of these variables refer to 
a census taken at a point in time and do not reflect the intensity of use. One variable 
having an impact on the intensity of use is the weather. In stormy weather the boats 
cannot go fishing. Nets and lines that are left lying could still be capturing fish, but they 
often get entangled during storms and lose some or all of their fishing power. The only 
continuous weather time series available in the Lofoten reports is the number of pull-
days; i.e., the number of days the boats can go out and pull up their nets or lines. This 
was used to construct a weather index normalized at unity at the average, with which the 
right hand side of Equation (3) was multiplied. Inclusion of this variable gave a 
significant result with the expected sign only for long line and purse seine, but did not 
much effect the numerical estimate of b and was dropped. 
Taking logarithms of (3) we get a linear function which is straightforward to 
estimate. However, a unit root test indicates that at least some of the time series are not 
stationary and, furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic for regressions in variable levels 
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indicates serial correlation of residuals. This suggests using first differences of 
logarithms, for which the unit root hypothesis can be rejected: 
(4) ( ) ( )1 0 1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t t tY Y a a L L b S S− −− = + − + − + tu−  
 The results of estimating (4) are given in Table 3, using fishermen (L) as a proxy 
for fishing effort. Below we will use level variables, and boats instead of fishermen, 
letting the number of boats be predicted by the catch per fisherman in the previous season 
(cf. the discussion in the previous section). As will be seen, the results produced by the 
two types of regressions are not radically different. 
For the traditional gears (gill nets, long line and hand line) the estimates of both a1 
and b are less than one, although for gill nets a1 is not significantly different from 1, 
while for hand line it is not even significantly different from zero. As shown in the 
appendix, the estimates of a1 are likely to be biased downward, but the values produced 
for long line and hand line are much lower than we would expect. The coefficient b is 
less than the often assumed value of one and indicates diminishing returns to the stock 
(for hand line b is not significantly different from one due to the wide confidence 
interval). The constant in these regressions reflects the time trend. None of the trend 
terms is significantly different from zero, but the point estimates indicate an increase of 
1-2 percent per year for gill nets and hand line, but none at all for long line. This is not 
entirely surprising; as Figure 5 indicates there was very little upward trend in the catch 
per fisherman until the mid-1960s, whereafter it increased very rapidly. 
 
Table 3: Results of regressing change in catch on change in effort (number of fishermen) and the change in 
fish stock (Equation [4]). First differences of logs. ** (*) Significance at 1% (5%) level, t-values in 
parentheses. 
 a1 b a0 R2 
Gill nets 
1900-1988 
0.8508** 
(4.51) 
0.3930** 
(2.71) 
0.0133 
(0.33) 
0.27 
Long line 
1900-1988 
0.3651** 
(2.07) 
0.6465** 
(5.68) 
-0.0010 
(-0.33) 
0.34 
Hand line 
1900-1988 
0.3302 
(1.59) 
0.5698** 
(2.17) 
0.0257 
(0.36) 
0.10 
Purse seine 
1950-1958 
0.9608** 
(4.11) 
2.1560 
(1.84) 
0.1481 
(0.48) 
0.83 
Danish seine 
1959-1988 
1.4751** 
(4.25) 
0.6048** 
(2.46) 
-0.0777 
(-0.79) 
0.47 
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The result for purse seine shows a value of a1 close to one, as expected, but an 
insignificant value of b, even if the point estimate is quite high and way above what we 
would expect to be the upper limit (one). The time series for this gear is probably too 
short (8 years) to produce meaningful results, and we will disregard it in the following. 
 For Danish seine we get diminishing returns to the fish stock, as for the traditional 
gear types, although b = 1 is within the confidence limits. The value of a1 is quite high, 
but also here with a1 = 1 within the confidence limits. The estimate for the time trend is 
strongly negative, but insignificant. 
Figure 7 shows catch versus labor input, and catch versus the size of the spawning 
stock, for the five types of gear. The figure illustrates the positive correlation we have 
found between catch and labor and catch and the spawning stock. For all gear types the 
correlation between the catch and the two said factors of production appears strong. 
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Figure 7: Catch, labor input, and spawning stock for the five types of gear used in the Lofoten fishery. 
 
4.2 Estimating productivity using instrumental variables 
An endogenous participation rate in the fishery will lead to a bias in the estimated 
parameter in the production function. It is expected that the bias will be downward in this 
case, since more fishermen, possibly negative selected, are entering the industry in good 
years or when the alternative employment possibilities are low. Hence, we decided to 
instrument the number of boats when estimating the production function. Above it was 
shown that the participation in the fishery by the boats using traditional gear has partly 
been determined by the catch per fisherman the previous year. This suggests using lagged 
catch per fisherman as an instrumental variable to determine the number of boats engaged 
in the fishery. These estimates are carried out in levels of variables, as most of the 
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participation each year is determined by the participation the year before, which is also 
used as instrumental variable to determine participation each year. We estimate separate 
equations for each gear.  The estimating equation is 
(5)  0 1 0 0 7 7ln ln ln ...t t tY a a B b S d D d D u= + + + + + + t
t(6) 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 7 7ln ln ln( / ) ln ...t t t tB B Y L S D Dβ β β β δ δ− −= + + + + + + +ν  
where Equation (6) is the first stage equation, using lnBt-1 and ln(Y/L)t-1 as instrumental 
variables for lnBt. D0 to D7 are dummy variables for decades, leaving out the incomplete 
decade 1980-1988. Including a log-linear time trend, as in (3), indicates a technological 
progress of around 2 percent per year for gill nets, hand line and Danish seine, but none 
for long line. A constant rate of technological progress over such a long time period as 89 
years is perhaps none too likely, as technological progress often occurs by leaps and 
bounds and is rapidly diffused. The decadal dummies allow us to account to some extent 
for the possibility of an uneven technological progress. The results are shown in Table 4 
and indicate a somewhat uneven rate of technological progress; note that the technology 
is measured with reference to the decade 1980-1988, so the decadal dummies should be 
negative and rising towards zero. With an even technological progress, as implied by the 
log-linear trend term in (3), the coefficients of the decadal dummies would increase 
monotonically. They do increase, as expected, but somewhat unevenly. The coefficients 
for the first two decades (1900-1919) are negative and significant for all gear types. For 
the hand line boats it appears that technological progress mainly occurred in the 1920s; 
the coefficients of the decadal dummies are all insignificant and small from that time on. 
This could possibly be due to bigger boats being used in the 1920s than before or since; 
in Figure 6 we see that the number of fishermen per boat increased suddenly in the 1920s 
and then fell again. More generally, technical progress here simply means that each boat 
becomes more efficient, either due to being bigger or better equipped. 
Both gill nets and long line have negative coefficients for the decadal dummies 
from the 1920s up to the 1960s, some of them significantly so, and with a rising trend, as 
expected. The boats thus gradually became bigger or better equipped, or both. Curiously 
the 1970s seem to have been technologically superior to the 1980s for all types of gear. 
Danish seine, which came on the scene in 1959, also seems to have experienced 
technological progress in the 1970s, the dummy for the 1960s is significantly negative. 
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Table 4: Regression (Equation [5]) with catch per man lagged one year and the number of boats lagged one 
year as instrumental variable to determine number of boats. d0-d7 are coefficients for dummy variables for 
decades. t-values in parentheses. 
 
 a1 b d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 a0 R2 
Gill 
nets 
.9319 
(2.56) 
.3586 
(3.28) 
-1.39 
(2.87) 
-1.26 
(4.17) 
-.45 
(1.57) 
-.51 
(1.40) 
-.02 
(0.11) 
-.34 
(1.91) 
-.19 
(0.86) 
.23 
(1.29) 
1.74 
(0.78) 
.66 
Long 
line 
.7082 
(3.16) 
.6417 
(4.66) 
-.96 
(1.86) 
-1.27 
(2.26) 
-.97 
(1.89) 
-1.02 
(2.30) 
-.50 
(1.41) 
-.51 
(2.41) 
-.20 
(1.06) 
.43 
(2.98) 
1.65 
(1.88) 
.86 
Hand 
line 
.7685 
(3.77) 
.4138 
(2.01) 
-1.53 
(3.74) 
-1.26 
(3.46) 
-.003 
(0.01) 
-.12 
(0.24) 
.09 
(0.21) 
-.16 
(0.45) 
.04 
(0.14) 
.36 
(1.31) 
.83 
(0.64) 
.86 
Danish 
seine 
1.1173 
(5.26) 
.7296 
(3.28) 
      -.53 
(2.16) 
.06 
(0.33) 
-.69 
(0.36) 
.84 
 
As to the coefficients a1 and b, the results for b are quite similar to the ones in 
Table 3, especially for gill nets and long line. All are significantly greater than zero and 
(except for Danish seine) less than one. The a1-values are quite different, except for gill 
nets, and closer to one; none is in fact significantly different from one. There are two 
reasons to regard these results as more satisfactory than the previous ones. First, constant 
returns to scale in producing fishing effort implies a1 = 1, but as discussed in the 
Appendix, the estimate of a1 could be biased downwards. Second, as already mentioned, 
the OLS estimates are likely to be biased downwards. The instrumental variable approach 
corrects for this.15 
The question arises whether the technological progress that apparently has taken 
place in the fishery is biased in the sense of affecting the parameters a1 and b. Especially 
the latter appears to be a possibility. One type of technological progress that has taken 
place in the fishery is the development of fish finding equipment, from depth meters 
showing concentrations of fish as shades close to the ocean bottom to sonar searching for 
fish in all directions. A b-coefficient close to one would reflect either of two different 
situations: (i) the fish are always uniformly distributed over a given area, so that a small 
stock is less dense than a large one: (ii) the fish become more difficult to find the smaller 
the stock is. Fish finding equipment would clearly be helpful in the latter situation and 
could thus reduce the value of b. To examine this we looked at the interaction between 
the stock and the decadal dummies. The coefficients of these interaction terms vary in 
                                                 
15 In fact, OLS estimate in levels gives very similar results to those in Table 4, with a lower estimate of a1 
only for long line. 
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sign without any trend and are never significant. There is thus no sign that technological 
progress has been biased in the sense of making the fish stock more or less important as a 
factor of production. The same kind of interaction between the time dummies and the 
number of boats was also examined. For long line there is some indication of such 
interaction; two of the interaction coefficients are significant, but the implied values of a1 
are unreasonable, being close to zero.16  
 
5. Labor and total factor productivity growth  
As Figure 5 indicated, labor productivity in the Lofoten fishery has grown unevenly and 
often declined from one year to another. For about a hundred years there was negligible 
growth in productivity, but a lot of variation. What could account for this comparatively 
poor performance? Was it due to a depletion of the fish stock or absence of technological 
progress? Since we have data on the fish stock only from 1900 we are not able to push 
the comparison further back in time. This is a bit unfortunate, because 1900 was a bad 
year with low labor productivity (cf. Figure 5). 
To examine this, we look at the development of total factor productivity. The 
growth rate of total factor productivity is 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2
1
, 1
1 1 1
/ 1
/ / /
TFP t t
t t a a
t t t t t t
Y YG
L L B B S S
+
+
+ + +
= −b
                                                
 
Because of the high correlation between fishermen and boats, it is not possible to 
estimate the coefficients a1 and a2 separately for each gear type, as one of the variables 
involved picks up most of the influence of the other. Using panel methods and dummies 
for two of the three traditional gears gives reasonable estimates of these coefficients, 
however:17 
(8)  0 1 2ln ln lnt t t t HL HL LL LL tY a a L a B bS d D d D gt u= + + + + + + +
where DHL and DLL are dummy variables for hand line and long line, respectively. 
 The results of estimating (8) are reported in Table 5. The two a’s nearly sum to 
one, implying that fishing effort is produced with a constant returns to scale technology,18 
 
16 An F-test of including the interaction terms is just barely significant (5% level) for gill nets and all 
interaction terms (time dummies and stock and time dummies and boats), but insignificant for all others. 
17 Purse seine and Danish seine were not included in this exercise. 
18 An F-test of the restriction a1 + a2 = 1 is insignificant and in fact produces a slightly negative F-value. 
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and in what follows we shall use the values a1 = 0.65 and a2 = 0.35.They also come close 
to agreeing with the revenue shares of labor and capital. The cost and earnings studies of 
the Lofoten fishery referred to in the section on the data report these revenue shares, 
determined by rules agreed between fishermen and the boatowners, who often were 
fishermen themselves. A part of the revenues was for the boat and so a compensation for 
the capital equipment used, another part was shared among the fishermen, and a third part 
was for defraying the expenses for the fishing gear, which the fishermen provided 
themselves. The reports for 1936-1951 show the combined share of labor and gear, which 
was fairly stable at 70-75 percent. The reports 1955-1962 show all three. If we treat the 
gear as short term inputs and not as capital investment and adjust the boat and labor 
shares accordingly, we find that the average labor share was 61, 57 and 64 percent for gill 
net, long line and hand line boats, respectively. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of a1, a2 and b using panel data (Equation [7]). t-values in parentheses. *(**) 
significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
 
a1 a2 b dHL dLL g a0 R2 
.6376 
(4.16**) 
.2965 
(2.03*) 
.4393 
(5.82**) 
-1.0524 
(-7.74**) 
.1200 
(1.48) 
.0233 
(15.91**) 
-1.2188 
(-2.79**) 
0.87 
 
Using interaction terms of time and boats and gear types and boats, it was 
investigated whether these shares might differ between gear types or change over time. 
The only significant (at the 5 percent level) interaction term was obtained for long line 
and boats and indicated that the share of boats using long line is lower than for the other 
two. We find this difficult to believe, given that long line boats are larger than hand line 
boats, and it also disagrees with the results in the 1955-1962 cost and earnings studies, 
which show the lowest labor share for long line boats. Interaction terms for time and 
boats and time and men were insignificant, indicating no change in the a’s over time.  
Other results in Table 5 are also sensible. The b-value is about the same as 
obtained for gill nets in Table 4, but lower than the ones obtained for the other two 
traditional gear types. Interaction terms for the fish stock and these two gear types were 
nevertheless insignificant, but the point estimate for hand line very nearly agrees with the 
result in Table 4. Technological progress is estimated at about two percent per year, and 
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hand line boats are shown to be significantly less productive than gill net boats, while 
there is no significant difference between long line and gill net boats. This agrees with the 
fact that hand line boats employ fewer fishermen than gill net boats (cf. Figure 6). Given 
that the same is true for long line boats, albeit to a lesser extent, we would have expected 
also to see a negative point estimate for the long line dummy, but smaller in absolute 
value than for hand line boats. 
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Figure 8: Labor productivity and total factor productivity in the Lofoten fishery. 
 
Figure 8 shows the development in total factor productivity and labor 
productivity. In calculating total factor productivity, we have used the b-values in Table 
4. For the three traditional gear types there is not much difference between the two 
productivity measures. Up to the 1960s the development in total factor productivity was 
more even than for labor productivity alone. This is as expected; some of the variability 
in labor productivity is due to variations in the fish stock, which is taken into account by 
total factor productivity. In the 1920s and again in the 1940s and 50s the stock was 
plentiful (cf. Figure 1), which gave labor productivity a boost while the total factor 
productivity was not so great once the stock abundance had been accounted for. For gill 
nets we see that productivity was low in the first two decades of the 20th century, which 
accords with the significantly negative dummy variables for these two decades reported 
in Table 4. In the period 1920-60 total factor productivity was higher than in the first two 
decades of the 20th century, and labor productivity higher still; this accords with the 
higher decadal dummies we found for gill nets in Table 5 for this period. Then, from the 
mid-1960s on, both total factor productivity and labor productivity shot up and also 
became more variable; this is captured by the high decadal dummy for the 1970s. 
The pattern for long line is similar to that for gill nets, the main difference being 
that productivity did not begin to rise until the 1940s instead of the 1920s, which accords 
with the low decadal dummies for long line in the 1920s and 30s (cf. Table 4). Both labor 
productivity and total factor productivity are a lot more variable for hand line, but the 
pattern is not very different from the one for gill nets. Total factor productivity for hand 
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line reached a peak in the 1920s, not to be surpassed until the 1960s. This accords with 
the small and insignificant dummies for the decades from the 1920s to the 1960s (cf. 
Table 4). This high productivity of boats in the 1920s may have been due to the 
employment of more fishermen; for a brief period in the 1920s there were about as many 
fishermen per hand line boat as there were per long line boat (Figure 6). 
Danish seine, which did not appear until 1959, shows quite a different pattern. 
Here labor productivity fluctuates without much trend while total factor productivity is on 
a weakly rising trend and in all years higher than labor productivity, except for the initial 
reference year. This could indicate an ongoing technological progress being neutralized 
by a decline in the fish stock; the fish stock in 1988 was only about one half of what it 
was in 1959 (cf. Figure 2). 
 
Table 6: Rates of growth of total factor productivity and labor productivity based on 9-years moving 
average. 
 
Gear Gill nets Long lines Hand lines Danish seine 
Average growth 
rate of labor 
productivity  
0.0181 0.0165 0.0153 0.0111 
Average growth 
rate of TFP 
0.0209 0.0232 0.0163 0.0222 
TFP-index for end 
year 
536 641 370 162 
 
Because of the large inter-annual variability, it is of doubtful value to look at 
average (geometric) growth rates based on annual data, as this affords undue weight to 
initial and final years, which may be untypical. Instead we shall calculate the average 
growth rate based on the 9-year moving average (cf. Figure 5). The results are reported in 
Table 6. Total factor productivity has grown faster than labor productivity for all gear 
types, slightly more than two percent per year for gill nets and long line, and a bit less for 
hand line. There are two potential reasons for this, more fishermen per boat and a decline 
in the fish stock. Consider total factor productivity and labor productivity in year T versus 
the initial year. Total factor productivity in year T relative to year 0 is (cf. [3] and [7]): 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 200 0
/1
/ / /
TTFP T
a a
T T T
Y YG
0
bL L B B S S
+ =  
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TFPG  being the average growth rate of productivity. Dividing by labor productivity in 
year T relative to year 0, denoting the average growth rate of labor productivity by LPG , 
and noting that a2 = 1 – a1, gives 
(10) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
0 0
0
0 0
/
1 1 /
/ /1
/
a
T TT TTFP TFP
T bLPT T T
L B
G G L B
Y L S SG
Y L
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠= =
+
 
 
From (10) we see that total factor productivity will grow faster than labor 
productivity if the number of fishermen per boat rises or if the fish stock declines. That 
an increase in the number of fishermen per boat accounts for the difference between the 
growth in total factor productivity and labor productivity can be dismissed. For gill nets 
and hand line the number of fishermen per boat declined from the early 20th century to 
the 1980s, while for long line it was nearly the same. The fall in the number of fishermen 
per boat masks the deleterious effect of the decline in fish stock on productivity; for hand 
line the growth rate of total factor productivity is nearly the same as for labor 
productivity, while the difference is not very large for gill nets. For long line the effect is 
clearer; for this gear the growth rate of total factor productivity is appreciably higher than 
for labor productivity. For Danish seine the number of fishermen per boat increased over 
the time considered (1959-1988), but only by about 12 percent, while the fish stock fell 
by about one half. So even here the difference in growth of labor productivity and total 
factor productivity is due to a falling fish stock 
 
6. Conclusion  
For about a hundred years labor productivity in the Lofoten fishery varied a great deal but 
hardly increased, while from the mid-1960s to the 1980s it almost trebled. Still, this 
would not have been enough to prevent the fishery from lagging behind agriculture and 
manufacturing; but with prices rising still more rapidly, revenues per fisherman in the end 
did better than keeping up with the wages in these sectors, using 1860 as a base year. 
Productivity in value terms began to outpace physical productivity in the late 1930s, at 
which time price regulation was introduced. This may have resulted in higher prices, and 
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seems to have stabilized prices, making them less dependent on the quantity caught. 
From the mid-1950s price subsidies were provided, which is likely to have led to higher 
and more stable prices. These subsidies were not eliminated until after the end of the 
period being analyzed here (Hannesson, 1996).  
It is puzzling how the Lofoten fishery could continue for about a hundred years 
without any increase in productivity while wages in other sectors of the economy rose. 
The answer may lie in the fact that the Lofoten fishery is a seasonal fishery, combined 
with participation in other fisheries and agriculture. The returns from these activities may 
have been sufficient to justify participation in the Lofoten fishery, especially since this 
coincided with low activity in the other occupations. Furthermore, the Lofoten fishery 
provided cash income, while the farming activities with which it was combined were 
largely for subsistence. This may have meant an extra premium for the Lofoten fishery, 
even if the results were meager. Many fishermen did, however, combine the Lofoten 
fishery with other fisheries which also provided cash income. 
From the early 1950s the participation in the Lofoten fishery, both in terms of the 
number of fishermen and the number of boats, fell steeply. This was a time when the 
Norwegian economy reached full employment and attained a high rate of economic 
growth. In the mid-1960s and possibly earlier, productivity (in value terms) in the 
Lofoten fishery began to outpace wages in agriculture and manufacturing, and from the 
mid-1960s the decline in the participation in the Lofoten fishery was slowed 
considerably, but not reversed. The productivity improvement in the Lofoten fishery was 
largely due to rising prices; in terms of volume it still lagged behind wages in agriculture 
and manufacturing. It is possible to argue that the rise in prices soothed the impact of 
open access and kept people in the fishery to a greater extent than warranted. 
Total factor productivity has risen faster than labor productivity in the Lofoten 
fishery. While the technological progress in the fishery has probably been comparable to 
other industries in the long term, even if it has been uneven over time, it has to some 
extent been neutralized by a decline in the fish stock. This decline would have prevented 
the Lofoten fishermen from reaping the full benefits of technological progress, but rising 
prices came to the rescue. 
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It is tempting to ascribe this discrepancy between the development in total factor 
productivity and labor productivity to the classic open access curse. As discussed above, 
the Lofoten Law of 1857 established the Lofoten fishery as an open access one and did 
away with whatever exclusive use rights that had developed in the fishery prior to that 
time. Improving the lot of fishermen was the most likely intention; this was well before 
the concept of biological overfishing had been generally recognized, and the science of 
fisheries biology was yet to be developed.19 In the longer term, however, this may have 
been self-defeating through encouraging excessive participation in the fishery and 
exposing it to the familiar evils of open access. There are three types of problems caused 
by open access that we may identify for the purpose of this discussion: 
(i) excessive fishing, leading to a diminishing fish stock and lower future returns; 
(ii) overcrowding on the fishing banks, with one fisherman’s gear taking fish that 
another could have taken later in the season; 
(iii) overcrowding so that one fisherman’s gear intervenes directly with another’s, 
for example through entanglements. 
As to the first effect, this was most likely present to some extent. The mature part of 
the cod stock consists of several year classes of fish. Increased fishing effort in any one 
year lowers the survival rate of the year classes, which reduces the stock of fish available 
in later years. The number of boats and fishermen was at its highest in the two decades 
before 1900 and again in the 1920s and 30s, and so the stock externality is likely to have 
been most prominent in those years. These were also periods of declining productivity, 
preceded by a period of higher productivity that may have called forth greater fishing 
effort (cf. Figure 4). But each year the mature stock is replenished with new cohorts. This 
was increasingly determined by what was left over by the ocean fisheries that developed 
over the last century and mainly fished young, immature fish. Until the early 1930s the 
catches in the Lofoten fishery were in some years almost one half of the catches of the 
Northeast Arctic cod, but after 1950 they seldom exceeded 10 percent. As the 20th 
century proceeded, the decline in the fish stock available for the Lofoten fishery was 
increasingly due to a rising fishing pressure in the offshore fisheries. 
                                                 
19 The history of the science of fisheries biology is told in Smith (1994). 
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The Lofoten reports in the 1930s make repeated references to excessive 
participation in the fishery, alleging that the revenues per fisherman would most likely 
improve if there were fewer of them. It was never made explicit exactly why this would 
happen: there is no reference to a “dynamic stock externality” by which excessive fishing 
in one year would reduce the catches in the coming years. By the 1930s it was certainly 
well known that the Lofoten fishery was based on several year classes, and that the 
survival rate of the fish to a large extent determined how much would be available the 
next year; in fact, there are supplementary chapters on this in many of the annual reports 
in the 1930s and even earlier, contributed by fisheries biologists. It is likely, however, 
that those who penned the annual reports had in mind problems Two and Three above, 
i.e., conflict between gears or gear types on the fishing banks, which increasingly had to 
be divided between different gear types to avoid conflicts, and fish being caught early in 
the season instead of being available later if there had been fewer fishermen and boats. 
With respect to the latter, it does not seem to have been serious enough to affect the time 
pattern of landings. 
In the difficult years of the 1930s, new and more productive technology was the 
solution envisaged in the Lofoten reports. Experimenting with new types of gear had a 
long history in the Lofoten fishery, and so did the opposition to any such or other novelty. 
The opposition in the 1700s to gill nets and long line was mentioned earlier. The Lofoten 
reports in the 1800s inform that some fishermen believed that the underwater telegraph 
cables killed the fish; dead fish were reported to be deposited along the tracks of these 
cables (how did people know?). The report writers in the 1800s promoted scheduled calls 
by steamships to outlying parts of Lofoten during the fishing season, but some fishermen 
thought this would scare the fish away. As the boats became equipped with engines, the 
sound from these was alleged to do so. Experiments with seines were made in the late 
1800s, but in the 1890s all seines were banned from Lofoten, due to pressure from 
fishermen. From the 1920s on government-financed experiments with various types of 
seines took place, and around 1950 the Lofoten reports were enthusiastic about the purse 
seine. In 1950 this gear began to be used on an appreciable scale, but it took only a 
couple of years for the reports to express great doubts about this. The fishermen using the 
“traditional” gear saw it as a threat, in the spirit of their forerunners in the 1700s who felt 
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the same way about gill nets and long lines. The purse seine took up a lot of space, and it 
was quite effective, threatening to make a large number of fishermen redundant. In 1958 
it was outlawed. 
The “long waves” in participation in the Lofoten fishery are consistent with the 
role of an open access fishery as livelihood of last resort, where people enter or exit as a 
result of demographic pressures or rise and falls in outside options.  The immigration to 
Nordland County before 1900 was accompanied by increasing participation in the 
fishery, the emigration, both to America and to the rest of the country, coincided with a 
decline in participation, and participation in the fishery reached new heights as 
emigration, both to America and the rest of the country, more or less came to an end in 
the 1920s and 30s. Then, as the Norwegian economy entered the era of full employment 
and economic growth after the Second World War, participation in the fishery declined, 
especially as regards the number of fishermen, and labor productivity in the fishery rose. 
The history of the Lofoten fishery has a familiar ring to it; this is not unlike the 
situation in the fisheries of many of the world’s poor countries today. For a long time the 
Lofoten fishery played the role of an employment opportunity of last resort; when times 
were bad people had resort to it, because of its open access character. There was political 
pressure from fishermen to keep things that way, and pressure to ban new technologies 
that would save labor in the fishery and would be expensive for fishermen to acquire. 
Open access and prohibition of some efficient technologies (but not all) may have 
succeeded in distributing incomes more widely, but one may ask whether increased 
participation led to lower returns and only succeeded in distributing poverty more widely. 
Banning more efficient technologies and the development of access rights in suitable 
localities is certainly likely to have meant foregoing increases in productivity. 
And as times got better, the exodus began. Productivity improved, partly through 
technological improvement but probably because of less participation as well. The 
productivity improvement may well have been self-enhancing, due to a positive feedback 
on technology; new technology is typically expensive and its returns uncertain, so poor 
fishermen are unlikely to introduce it, as is also abundantly clear from the opposition to 
new methods that always has come from the less well-off fishermen. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Assume the catch flow function is 
 
bdY ES
dt
= −  
 
With no stock growth and no natural mortality during the fishing period, we have 
 
bdY dS ES
dt dt
= − =  
or, in other words, catch over a period of length Δ will be simply the difference between 
the stock at the beginning of the period and the stock at the end of the fishing period: 
 
0Y S SΔ= −  
 
To find SΔ we solve the above differential equation for S. For b = 1 we get the following: 
 
lndS d S Edt
S
= = −∫ ∫ ∫  
 
0
ES S e− ΔΔ =  
 
( )0 1 EY S e− Δ= −  
 
Since 1  and diminishing in E, we will have diminishing returns to effort, 
which will give a lower estimate of a than is valid for the instantaneous yield function. 
Ee E− Δ− < Δ
 
For b < 1 we get 
 
 40
11
b
b SS dS Edt
b
−
− = = −−∫ ∫  
 
( )10 1bS S b E−Δ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦Δ  
 
 ( ) 1/(1 )10 0 0 1 bbY S S S S b E −−Δ ⎡ ⎤= − = − − − Δ⎣ ⎦  
 
Also here there are diminishing returns to E, and more so than with b = 1, so the estimate 
of a will be lower than what holds for the instantaneous yield function. 
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